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INTRODUCTION
This essay offers an analysis on Udjahorresnet as
diplomatic figure in the service of Achaemenid
Persia during the mid-1st millennium BCE from the
perspective of international relations (IR).1 The first
section provides a brief introduction into the central
research questions of IR theory in relation to ancient
history. In the second section, a concise factual
description will be given in order to clarify the object
of analysis, i.e., the diplomatic context, which saw
the crucial role of Udjahorresnet acting as an
Egyptian mediator in the face of the Persian
conquest of the land of the pharaohs. The third
section examines how the story of Udjahorresnet fits
into the research agenda of international relations:
this part forms the central argument of the article.
From the outset, however, the reader is well advised
to know that students of world politics only rarely
venture into the more remote past, and, when they
do, they usually do not go beyond the Renaissance
period. The 1st millennium BCE occasionally pops
up as IR scholars have analyzed the ancient Greek
city-state system during the period of classical
Greece (510−323 BCE) and somewhat less often
during the Spring-and-Autumn and Warring States
periods (771−221 BCE) in ancient China. These
examples show that the past, including the ancient 
past, is relevant in the theory-building of interna-
tional relations. Moreover, at the beginning of the
21st century there has been a historical turn in the
field of IR, which not only embraces the historical 
method but also rejects the idea of explanatory
precision and predictive certainty based on the
model of physical sciences.2 Nevertheless, the Anglo-
American research tradition based on scientific
modeling has left a legacy that is still visible in the
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discipline.3 Accordingly, students of world politics
aim for parsimony, i.e., they attempt to explain as
much as possible empirical phenomena with as little
theoretical apparatus as possible, whereas historians
prefer complexity through “total” explanations and
narration.4 This divide in approach, although by no
means all encompassing, sets the stage for the
conceptual analysis that lies ahead of us. Relevant
research questions that accompany such analysis
would include what kind of units dominate the
system, what is the scale of the system, what types
of process—whether societal, economic, or military-
political—define the system, how do units and
structures interact with each other, and, finally, what
is the logical endpoint for the systemic interaction.
In international relations, the most important
political unit, the modern nation-state, is considered
to be some 500 years5 old, but if we follow this track,
we leave the development of early states, including
territorial states and empires, outside the purview of
IR scrutiny. In fact, international relations scholar-
ship has only recently started to make tentative
ventures into to the world of ancient Near East. A
promising example of this is the work of a group of
political scientists who analyzed power balancing
during the Neo-Assyrian rule in the edited volume
Balance of Power in World History, giving recognition
to the political entity of “state” in this early context.6
Other fields, from astronomy and mathematics to
history of law, medicine, technology, economics, and
cultural anthropology, have already joint forces
several decades ago to wage “the battle for
synthesis,” in the words of A. Leo Oppenheim, an
Assyriologist, with the aim of making a better sense
of ancient Near Eastern (ANE) studies.7 To be sure,
Egyptologists, Assyriologists, and other disciplines
focusing on the ANE can gain valuable insights from
the IR approach to see the bigger picture of great
power dynamics irrespective of the discipline’s
rather presentist temporal span. The specific
contribution of international relations for ANE
studies lies in making better sense of theoretical
concepts, which “are derived from history just as
history is used to test these concepts and categories,”
as George Lawson, an IR scholar, observes.8
Conceptual analysis matters, for the real question is
not only the one put forth by Felix Berenskoetter,
who asks whether we should use basic concepts that
did not exist in the past to reconstruct that past.9 We
can also pose the question raised by a French
Assyriologist, Bertrand Lafont: “… is it necessary to
conceptualize diplomacy to make diplomacy?”10
What essentially is at stake here is the actual political
behavior—whether diplomatic, imperialistic, or
based on the policy of power balancing—of the
entities involved, not the theoretical abstractions
around which to build a reality. If we accept this
premise, then the analysis of the Achaemenid
period, or any other period in ancient history,
becomes possible from IR angle.
THE STORY OF UDJAHORRESNET
In the Museo Gregoriano of the Vatican Museums, we
find a most intriguing artifact dating back to the first
Persian period (ca. 525−400 BCE): the Naoforo
Vaticano.11 Inscribed upon the statue is the autobiog-
raphy of Udjahorresnet, an Egyptian high official,
physician, priest, and naval officer (he retained only
civilian titles after the Persian conquest) whose
crucial eyewitness testimony describes the transition
of power from native Egyptian hands to the Persians
and the handing over to him of the office of chief
physician.12 The statue offers the best first-hand
personal account of Persia’s conquest of Egypt at this
moment of time, although he was not the only
Egyptian high official to cooperate with the
Persians.13 However, the classical authors tend to
paint a more unfavorable image of the Achaemenid
rulers than their Egyptian counterparts.14 The
negative effects of the Achaemenid conquest of
Egypt on the Greek poleis and the Greco-Persian
Wars (490, 480−479 BCE) that ensued few decades
later undoubtedly started to have a biasing effect on
the way the Greeks depicted Persians, and this has
had a lasting impression until modernity.15 The
contemporary term to describe Udjahorresnet’s role
in all this is to call him a “mediator” between the two
great states: he seems to have been genuinely
respected by the Achaemenids, although the real
power always rested on the side of the Persians. In
light of the evidence, the main contribution of
Udjahorresnet relates to the fact that he made the
Persian rule somewhat easier for the local
population to accept. Still, it is hard to imagine how
the Egyptian elite would have complied in the face
of the Persians, had the latter not made real 
conciliatory gestures such as accepting the tradi-
tional model of Egyptian kingship—and despite
these gestures, the Persians were up against several
rebellions by the Egyptians, such as the unsuccessful
revolt of Inarus (ca. 460−454 BCE), who created an
international coalition against Artaxerxes I.16 A
major historiographical problem relates to ancient
Egyptian texts. They are marred not only with chal-
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lenges and problems of interpretation depending on
the literary genre and the presence of religious and
cosmic beliefs but also with the question of exagger-
ation on the part of the officials in the highest 
echelons of power.17 Therefore, we have to be prudent
about the influence Udjahorresnet ultimately bestowed
upon the Persian king Cambyses II, who is remem-
bered for having continued on the imperial path of
his father Cyrus the Great by conquering Egypt. Yet
contemporary Egyptian texts largely confirm Udja-
horresnet’s narrative, and the circumstantial evidence
speaks in favor of the high official’s story—why
would Cambyses not have made an honest effort to
reconcile the Egyptians to Persian rule in order to
guarantee the necessary status quo, we might be
obliged to ask. The same pattern of cooperation con-
tinued in the relationship between Udjahorresnet
and Darius I, and, in this, the former was simply re-
sponding to imperatives that were not unique to
Udjahorresnet, for this was not the first time Egypt
was under occupation, nor would it be the last. 
Although Egyptologists have tended to under-
value the Late Period, seen as the last stage of a once 
great culture, it renders at least one crucial
advantage: the period disposes a much broader
range of written evidence offering potential for
cross-reference instead of one-sided native Egyptian
narrative filled with propaganda.18 This fact does not
necessarily allow a more objective view of the era, as
there was anti-Persian bias in the texts of the classical
authors, but it does make it more multidimensional
for historical analysis. On balance, what we know
from the nature of the Persian occupation of Egypt
is that the Persians were perfectly willing to work
with and promote native Egyptians to assist in
government. Persian kings like Cambyses II and
Darius paid close attention to the religious 
sensitivities and local customs by declaring them-
selves pharaohs. A rather risqué example of this is
the claim, although erroneous, that Cambyses was
the son of Cyrus by Princess Nitetis, the daughter of
the pharaoh Apries.19 In the field of administration,
the Persians left the local governance to the natives
while making sure that at the top a satrap, i.e.,
viceroy, was drawn from the Persian aristocracy.
This kind of indirect and pragmatic rule gave lever-
age to Egyptians, including Udjahorresnet, to
occupy positions of importance, if not power.20 Still, 
unlike the Hyksos rule more than a millennium
earlier during the Second Intermediate Period
(1650−1550 BCE), the Persian rule seems to have
arrived more abruptly and violently, even though
there is no evidence of systematic destruction, than
the more gradual or “creeping” Hyksos conquest
marked by earlier acculturation to the Egyptian 
society.21 However, it is quite possible that Cambyses,
whose father Cyrus the Great gave the famous 
declaration known as the Cyrus Cylinder, was
influenced by this kind of imperial propaganda to
give legitimacy to his own rulership: the declaration
employed the language and idioms of the
Babylonian priesthood, not the Achaemenids, and in
similar fashion, in Egypt the politico-religious
sentiments had to be taken into account by the
Persians.22 In this fashion the Persians tried to win
the hearts and minds of its most precious imperial
possession, Egypt.
The above contextualizing has so far tackled the
general contours of the story of Udjahorresnet. We
have to go deeper, however, by taking a look into
what the actual naophorous statue tells us about
how Udjahorresnet experienced the Persian over-
lordship. Udjahorresnet gives us several clues as to
the way the Egyptians were coming to grips with
the power transition. Following Alan Lloyd’s and 
Lisbeth S. Fried’s reasoning, we can assess two
specific expressions used by Udjahorresnet while
referring to the arrival of the Persian king Cambyses
II in Egypt. First, according to the chief physician,
Cambyses and his entourage came to Egypt as “the
Great Chief of all foreign lands,” and second, after
having established themselves, “he was the Great
Ruler of Egypt and Great Chief of all foreign
lands.”23 The implication is that the Persian king first
came to Egypt as a conqueror, i.e., as an enemy,
whereas he soon became the ruler of Egypt, which
in Lloyd’s view signifies a positive force and a
champion of the cosmic order.24 Whether the title
“Great Ruler of Egypt” carries the message of a
wider acceptance by the local populace is another
issue, but we can assume that the Egyptian ruling
class, for their part, accepted the Persian rulership,
at least for the time being. From an intentionalist
perspective, the autobiography of Udjahorresnet
holds other useful information for deciphering
personal and other motives. Among them has to be
included the religious aspect as when Cambyses, 
following the wishes of Udjahorresnet, “commanded
to expel all the foreigners who dwelt in the temple
of Neith, to tear down their houses and their entire
refuse which was in the temple.” Udjahorresnet con-
tinues: “This did his majesty do because I caused
15
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his majesty to recognize the importance of Sais (…
city of all gods …).”25 Religious sensitivities are a
well-known cause for sedition inside empires, so it
is not surprising that Cambyses was quick to comply
with Udjahorresnet’s wishes. It becomes obvious
that Udjahorresnet had become a trusted man for
the Persian rulers. For example, we learn from the
autobiography that he travelled to the Near East
with Darius and was allowed to return to Egypt
while Darius stayed in Elam. A more personal tone
of the biography comes out when the chief physician
acknowledges that “I was a learned man for all
lords; my character was judged good by them. They
gave me golden ornaments; they did everything
needful for me.”26 This passage conveys the image
that Udjahorresnet not only commanded respect on
the part of Cambyses and Darius but also had a 
personal self-interest in working closely with the
Great King—a modern reader would quickly
conclude that this is what being a collaborator or
even a traitor looks like. There is another passage in
the autobiography that is of great interest to us.
Udjahorresnet writes: “I saved its people from the
very great disaster, which befell in the entire land.”
Scholars are divided as to whether the expression
“the very great disaster” refers specifically to the
Persian invasion or whether we are dealing here
with a recital of conventional pious acts and civic 
virtues normally evoked in commemorative auto-
biographies of this type.27 Perhaps it can be argued
that ambivalence was warranted here since it would
have been too compromising to mention explicitly a
foreign threat by name. Either way, Udjahorresnet
did not shy away to depict himself as the savior of
his own people no matter what the cause of the
calamity. This fits into the character profile of a man
who was perfectly willing and able to take full
advantage of being the confidant of the Great Kings.
But what to make of all this when we approach
these events through the lenses of international
relations? Clearly, the historiographical aspects are
of secondary importance here since IR researchers
have a tendency to rely on secondary sources, or at
least they rely on them as much as, if not more than,
on primary sources. From that perspective the issue
is not really to what extent Herodotus and other
Greek authors had a bias when writing about the
Persian rule in Egypt. Getting the facts right of
course matters in order to make sound inferences,
but not to the same extent that a historian or an
Egyptologist would appreciate making a thorough
research based on the primary sources available or
making as accurate translations of the hieroglyphic
texts as possible. The answer lies elsewhere. The
autobiography of Udjahorresnet has to be seen in the
larger context of the Late Period (664−332 BCE) of
Egyptian history, which was characterized by four
distinct phases: the Saite dynasty (664−525 BCE), the
first Persian period (525−404 BCE), a period of
independence (404−343 BCE), and the second
Persian period (343−332 BCE). For a student of world
politics, the periodization tells something about the
overall power structure: the heyday of Egyptian
kingdom being more unitary was long gone. More
specifically, the power structure leads us to a term
known as the “level of analysis” in IR scholarship.28
The concept entails three levels: international, state,
and individual. At the international level, the ANE
was, for the time being, not anymore anarchic in the
sense it was a millennium earlier. Instead of a multi-
centric29 political arena, we see the Achaemenid
Empire imposing a hegemonic dominance on the
political units from the outer limits of the Balkans
and northern shores of the Black Sea in the west to
the Indus Valley in the east and northern Arabia,
Oman, Egypt, and Libya in the south. True, this
constellation was not entirely unitary, as the
simmering uprisings during the First Persian
Occupation in Egypt testify. Empire-building
projects do not to create solid, state-like structures
but rather political communities, which are by their
very nature volatile.30
From a systemic point of view, instead of being
diffuse, power now became more hegemonic in the
spirit of an “Achaemenid Peace” or Pax Persica, a
term that will interest us more in the next section.
Interestingly, there seem to have been power-
balancing mechanisms at work to counter the
Persian threat, when a grand alliance was created
consisting of Egypt, Lydia, the Chaldeans of
Babylonia, and even Sparta, yet their balancing
efforts ultimately failed. In IR theory, the state-level
perspective usually focuses on the internal political
system of the state, but in the case of the Achaemenid
Persia we can choose two other perspectives: internal
and external balancing. These two terms, straight out
of the realist school playbook, refer to the way states
try to strengthen their standing in a hostile political
landscape either by a process of military self-
strengthening or by seeking to make alliances.31
Finally, the individual level offers a philosophical
aspect as it refers to the human nature as the
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explicative variable—important causes of war and
other related phenomena such as empire-building
are to be found in the nature and behavior of man,
i.e., ambitious and war-like individuals. While this
variable is a bit general, it certainly applies to the
ancient, as well as to the modern, world, where
mixed motives of ambition and avarice played in the
birth and growth of conflicts.32 Even so, we have to
be careful not to fall into stereotypical thinking. In
the case of the Achaemenid Empire, the Persian
rulers were capable of showing imagination,
flexibility, and tolerance toward their subjects.33 For
all intents and purposes, the idea is to try to find a
meaningful balance between the above-raised
systemic, state, and individual levels of analysis,
which together enable us to address the concepts of
balance of power, international system, and soft
power. 
IR READING OF DIPLOMACY IN ANCIENT TIMES—
UDJAHORRESNET AS DIPLOMATIC FIGURE
At a superficial level, ancient history lacks the imme-
diate relevance sought in the discipline of IR. Yet, as
Raymond Cohen, an IR scholar, and Raymond West-
brook, an Assyriologist, recognize, this remoteness
from the contemporary world is educative in order
to assess whether such fundamental features of
international politics as states, national identities,
borders, sovereignty, government, international law,
balance of power, and diplomacy are permanent or
transitory in nature.34 If any of these institutions did
exist in the ancient world, then this begs the question
of how far back in time can we apply the idea of
international system and all the ingredients that go
with it. In any case, it seems quite inadequate to 
concur with a statement according to which the last
five hundred years are sufficient to analyze the
balance of power theory, among other things.35
Before tackling the role of Udjahorresnet as
diplomatic figure, it is useful to examine what do we
make of the concepts of “state,” “sovereignty,”
“empire,” and “international system,” because they
set the stage for the systemic side of power transition
of the Near East and Egypt to the aegis of
Achaemenid Persia.
There are several reasons why many political
scientists and IR scholars avoid scrutinizing distant
past. One of the obvious challenges for a student of
world politics is the fact that the premodern world,
ostentatiously, does not offer the necessary road map
for analysis. In concrete terms, the lack of conceptual
framework may seem intimidating for the sole
reason that the colloquial IR terminology is missing.
Few examples. The first recorded use of the English
word “diplomacy” by Edmund Burke, which itself
originates from the French term diplômes or “written
acts of sovereigns,” dates back to 1796, although, 
admittedly, the term “diploma,” meaning “privilege,”
was already known by the ancient Greeks.36 The
same is true of the expression “great power,” which
became a colloquial term only after the Napoleonic
Wars. The term was first used in its modern sense in
the negotiations leading to the Congress of Vienna
and more precisely in the correspondence of the
British Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh, who 
described it in several letters between 1813 and
1815.37 In effect, the very word “international”
belongs to the period of European enlightenment of
the 18th century, as it was a British philosopher
Jeremy Bentham who introduced the term in 1781.38
The list goes on if we add the concepts of “state” and
“sovereignty,” both of which became colloquial
terms only in the 16th century through the writings 
of Jean Bodin and Niccolò Machiavelli, respec-
tively.39 The modern world’s bias toward the
premodern world is not limited to international
relations alone. Moses Finley, probably best known
for his The Ancient Economy (1973), labeled the
ancient economic institutions as “static” and
“palace-dominated”—this no longer represents
what is happening in the dynamic world of scholar-
ship on ancient economies, where scholars see more
complex models of trade in which private and public
interests coexisted to some degree.40 In the case of
the 1st millennium BCE Near East, students of world
politics would ask how can we talk about an inter-
national system of states interacting as a political
arena when the “state,” which is a foundational
actor in the discipline, seems to be missing. The clos-
est entities we supposedly have at this moment in
time are city-states and their opposite counterparts
called empires. And if states are missing, how can
we expect that there is such a thing as international
system in this early context of international history?
There are two possible solutions to overcome these
complex issues. First, a lot depends on how we
define the state—the more we add narrowly defined
attributes to describe the state, the more likely we
are to exclude most political formations in world 
history.41 In political science and in IR scholarship
there is still a tendency to consider the entity of state
as a product of early modern Europe, i.e., the nation-
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state. Second, if we can find evidence in the primary
sources of the ancient world that supports the idea
that there were indeed states and other related
phenomena such as sovereignty, treaty-making, and
power balancing, then this is another way of
showing that it is unsatisfactory and even
detrimental to the theory-building to dwell
exclusively in the confines of modern world.
Nevertheless, we should not underestimate the
conceptual challenges when examining concepts
with strong contemporary strings attached to them. 
The second key concept to be looked is sovereignty,
because it serves as a connecting point between
states and international systems. Sovereignty, which
is intimately linked to the state, is two-dimensional
in nature, consisting of internal and external sover-
eignty. Internal sovereignty connotates supreme 
authority over a given political community, whereas
external sovereignty connotates the lack of over-
arching authority in the international realm between
political communities.42 The instability in the inter-
national arena that ensues in the absence of world
government is what IR scholars call international
anarchy.43 Sovereignty, then, is the intermediate link
between states and the system, which creates the
conditions for international systems to exist under
international anarchy.44 In the fields of international
relations and political science, the internal aspect of
sovereignty has received the bulk of attention
through definition of the state as “human commu-
nity that (successfully) lays claims to the monopoly
of the legitimate use of physical force within a given
territory—and this idea of ‘territory’ is an essential
defining feature.”45 However, Weber was explicitly
referring to modern states rather than early states,
emphasizing the bureaucratic nature of the early
20th-century state.46 As late as the mid-1980s,
Anthony Giddens would write that the existence of
“… international relations is coeval with the origins
of nation-states …” and that “… borders are only
found with the emergence of nation-states….”47 This
kind of interpretation of world politics is problem-
atic, culturally limited, and historically narrow, for
it alludes that the existence of a states system is
directly linked with the formation of modern
states.48 Although Gidden’s nation-state-centric
approach was being challenged already in the 1970s
by the dependency theorists and world-systems ana-
lysts, his approach has lingered as other scholars
have expressed similar views, considering early
states, whether tribes, chiefdoms, city-states, or
empires, as too loosely organized to qualify as states
and paying too little attention to the external side of
sovereignty.49 And yet, sovereignty, whether internal
or external, historians are quick to remind us, was a
long process, which began long before 1648 and con-
tinued long after, and still continues as it is an
ongoing and integral part of the phenomenon of
state formation.50 In the concrete case of ancient Near
Eastern history we witness a rich tradition of treaty-
making where territorial issues frequently pop up.
This fact alone speaks volumes in favor of the exis-
tence of external sovereignty in the premodern
world.
The third term to be assessed is “empire,” since it
features prominently in the story of Udjahorresnet.
To begin with, there is a multitude of definitions
over the word “empire” in the literature, but its
dominant characteristic lies in the element of
subordination of peripheral communities (former
states) to a core or metropolis that was originally
made up of the conquering and ruling polity.51 The
leading major powers in the ancient Near East, great
states like Assyria, Babylonia, Egypt, and Hatti, were
empires in the sense that they were large, multi-
ethnic political units, created by conquest, and
divided between a dominant center and subordinate
peripheries. However, contrary to a persistent, often
stereotypical, image outside ANE studies, the
ancient Near East was far from unitary. Instead,
there seem to have been a swing movement between
periods of political fragmentation and central rule,
and the starting point for empire-building projects
directs to expanding city-states. Joyce Marcus, from
the field of archaeology, argues convincingly that
territorial states and city-states “were often different
stages in the dynamic cycles of the same states rather
than two contrasting sociopolitical types” and that
“clusters of city-states were invariably the
breakdown product of earlier unitary states.”52 In
other words, we can see an ebb and flow process
between unitary and city-states polities, which are
by no means mutually exclusive. This kind of
environment bodes well for what the IR scholars call
a “complex interdependence,” or “the existence of
multiple channels of contact among societies.”53 If
we accept the above premise, then different balance
of power strategies in West Asia, including the
Achaemenid takeover of Egypt, make perfect sense.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the ancients did 
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not use abstract terms like “empire” or “imperialism.”
Yet as Barry J. Kemp, an Egyptologist, observes “…
It is in our assessment of politically real behaviour
that the answer is to be found as to whether they
acted in a manner analogous to states of later periods
who have conceived of ‘empire’...,” and other scholars
like Dominique Charpin have shared similar views.54
International systems have been extensively
studied in IR scholarship. It is a vast topic, which
cannot be thoroughly analyzed in the present
context, but nevertheless, few observations are worth
sharing. The English School of international
relations, a theoretical tradition inside the field,
started to theorize in the late 1950s the theoretical
constructs of international system and international
society. Two decades later, it was Hedley Bull, a
prominent intellectual figure of the school, who
brought the international system’s analysis to the
attention of the wider research community of the
discipline. Bull defined an international system as an
environment where “states are in regular contact
with one another, and in addition there is interaction
between them sufficient to make the behavior of each
a necessary element in the calculations of the other,”
whereas international society, according to him, was
“a group of states or independent political
communities which have established by dialogue
and consent common rules and institutions for the
conduct of their relations, and recognize their 
common interest in maintaining these arrange-
ments.”55 In Bull’s view, the main difference between
a system and a society is that in the systemic side of
the pendulum an intersubjective agreement—with
its shared norms, rules, and institutions among the
actors—is missing, i.e., the focus is mainly on the
interaction. Despite Bull’s neat categorization, he
seemed unsure at what point the international 
system and international society intertwine with
each other. Subsequently, IR theorists have rightly
criticized Bull’s conceptual classification as too rigid
and categorical—for when there is a system, there
are inevitably elements or seeds of society in the
making such as communication and diplomacy—
but also as too Eurocentric and historically narrow,
linking as he did these two concepts to the birth of
the modern state.56 This discussion need not concern
us here much further. Of greater interest for our pur-
poses is the historization of these two concepts. On
this domain, the writings of Barry Buzan and
Richard Little since the 1990s have been of some
importance. Both Buzan and Little have been con-
cerned about the presentist agenda of the IR field
and the obsession with the legacy of the peace of
Westphalia (1648), as well as the lack historical 
contextualization of the theoretical construct of inter-
national system.57 Despite raising awareness, the IR
field is yet to endeavor systematically how interna-
tional system and its endpoint, international society,
play out in the ancient Near Eastern political land-
scape.
When we scrutinize the story of Udjahorresnet, it
is not necessary to look for all the abovementioned
concepts. It is already an achievement if we can
establish that two or three constitutive IR concepts
are relevant in this early historical context. We have
already briefly mentioned one such concept, i.e., the
balance of power, but there are other candidates as
well. Before addressing them, however, it is useful
to go little further into the anatomy of power
balancing. The concept is highly relevant in this
setting, because the ancient Near Eastern history is
much more dynamic than the stereotypical story of
the rise and fall of empires. This is the image that
typically first comes to mind for the non-specialist.
If it can be established that power-balancing
strategies were part of the diplomatic and military
intercourse among various types of polities, then this
would contribute to IR theorizing, which continues
to lean primarily on the European experience. If we
study carefully the ancient past in Eurasia, an
argument can be made that the balance of power
theory goes back thousands rather than hundreds of
years. From this perspective, the analytical study of
the story of Udjahorresnet becomes quite feasible
and interesting for IR theory.  
The basic aim behind the idea of power balancing
is an even distribution of power. David Hume, the
philosopher of the Scottish Enlightenment, famously
asked in an essay titled “Of the Balance of Power”
(1752) the question that still stands: “It is a question
whether the idea of the balance of power be owing
entirely to modern policy, or whether the phrase
only has been invented in these later ages?”58
Theoretically, Hume’s way of thinking about the
matter is of great importance, for he wanted to know
whether the balance is a product of the modern
world or an age-old principle that has only recently
received theoretical recognition. By leaning on
classical scholars like Polybius and citing as
examples the power struggles aiming at creating a
balance among Greek city-states in the 5th and 4th
centuries BCE, Hume’s own answer was that the
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idea pre-dated the actual invention of the concept.
Over two centuries later, scholars in the field of IR
are still debating over the question of temporal
origins of the balance of power theory.59
What the story of Udjahorresnet tells us is that
attempts at power balancing were not limited to the
Western Mediterranean world, which is by extension
part of the European experience. In fact, there was a
rich tradition of balancing behavior in the ancient
Near East dating back at least to the 2nd millennium
BCE.60 In the specific case of Achaemenid conquest
of Egypt during the first Persian period, the counter-
balancing measures taken by Egypt, Lydia, the
Chaldeans of Babylonia, and Sparta ultimately failed,
but importantly it tells us that there seems to have
been a wider cognizance among these polities of the
fact that they formed a part of a bigger whole, i.e.,
an international system. Admittedly, the use of the
term “system” can be problematic, as it conveys the
image of a formal or holistic structure that lacks an
associational relationship and human volition, as
when we speak of the “digestive system” or the
“solar system.”61 The idea behind using the term is
to show that there was a pattern of behavior among
the political units, that things did not just happen 
by accident. If we follow Herodotus (1.77), who
appears to be the best ancient source on describing
the formation of the anti-Persian alliance, it was the
king of Lydia, Croesus, who was the primus motor
in putting this counter balancing effort on motion.
To be sure, personal ambition and geographical
vicinity to Persia also played their part.62 The conflict
itself between the Achaemenid Persia and Egypt
seemed inevitable as pharaoh Amasis II was actively
helping anti-Persian forces such as the Greek city-
states after the fall of Babylonia in 538 BCE.63 The fact
that their grand alliance failed to check the rise of
Persia is beside the point; what matters is the
balancing behavior itself. In concrete terms, the
external balancing measures of the anti-Persian
alliance failed to check the rise of Achaemenid Persia
as hegemon in the region. The external balancing,
unsuccessful though it was, goes against the view
still widely expressed in IR literature that the
ancients did not fully understand the mechanisms of
balancing. One often cited example is the way the
Hellenistic Diadochi Empires of Macedonia, the
Seleucid Empire, and Ptolemaic Egypt failed to
prevent the rise of Rome in the 2nd century BCE.64
From this perspective, the Egyptian-led campaign is
interesting indeed, since it shows that power
balancing was possible in a systemic level in the
ancient world, and it preceded the Greco-Roman
international arena.65
When we move to the state level of analysis in
dealing with the first Persian period, the second IR
concept of some use to us in understanding the
world of Udjahorresnet is internal balancing. The
counterpart to this term is external balancing, but
since power balancing in the form of alliance-making
equals external balancing and has already been
tackled, it will not receive further attention. Internal
balancing means those measures, whether economic
and military or both, that enhance a given state’s
capabilities internally. Akin to internal balancing,
there in IR literature is a vast scholarship on power
transition theories, which try to explain great-power
wars and causes of war in an environment where
rapid changes in the distribution of capabilities, i.e.,
in the relative power of states vis-à-vis other states,
threaten the primacy of the hegemon.66 Modern
examples of this include for instance Japan’s vast
domestic reform program after the Meiji Restoration
(1868) or Russia’s military reform in the 2010s in
quest of maintaining its great-power status.67 So far,
the power transition theory model has not been
applied to the ancient Near East by IR scholars—the
single notable exception being the relatively recent
work by Kaufman et al. (2007b) on the balance of
power in world history, and even here the authors
refer to the concept anecdotally.68 More interesting
is the analysis of the logic of anarchy within different
imperial contexts across Eurasia, stretching from
Han China and Persia to ancient Rome and the
British Empire by Barry Buzan et al. (1993). Contrary
to Kaufman et al., their approach is both general and
descriptive, and it does not fully address the various
aspects related to power balancing within the
abovementioned empires. Nevertheless, they do
tackle the important issue of balancing failure by
pointing that the inability of the Hellenistic polities
to ally themselves against the rising power of Rome
was not unique to antiquity and that similar
examples of failures in power balancing can be
found in more modern times as in the context of the
Italian city-states during the Italian Wars
(1494−1559).69 All the same, in the case of ancient
Egypt during the Late Period, we can argue with
some confidence that the internal balancing efforts
of the land of pharaohs were not particularly
successful, at least in the long run. Following the line
of thought of William J. Murnane,70 it is clear that
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there was a sort of swing movement between more
unitary efforts to solidify Egypt followed by internal
division, rebellions, civil wars, and external threats
posed by the Sea Peoples, as well as the Libyans on
the western border. So, overall, gone were the days
of the New Kingdom, which saw Egypt as a regional
hegemon. The 1st millennium is a story of a
gradually weakening major state, which was
internally weak. Certainly, there were momentary
periods when Egyptian pharaohs tried to remedy
the situation with some success, e.g., when pharaoh
Shoshenq I attempted to rebuild his kingdom’s
economy and inner cohesion during the Twenty-
second Dynasty. These measures worked for a
century, but by the later 9th century the country was
split into warring factions. And yes, Egypt was to
attain one more time a great-power status under
Psamtik I, which thrived and saw an Egyptian
presence in the Levant once again during the late
Neo-Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian Empires. Yet,
ultimately, Egypt could not withstand the growth of
Persian power under Cyrus the Great, who was
more than skillful in splitting up the international
coalition of threatened nations, including Egypt.
Consequently, the land of the pharaohs was defeated
at the battle of Pelusium (ca. 527/526 BCE).71 The
above narrative does not suggest that Egypt’s
demise was inevitable, but it does show that
internally the kingdom was in a difficult spot to try
to match the threat posed by the might of
Achaemenid Persia. We get an idea of this even from
the Vatican naophorous statue where the conqueror
of Egypt, Cambyses II, is put on equal standing with
the pharaohs that had preceded him.72 Cambyses
wanted thus to legitimize himself before the
Egyptian people by entering in the complex politics
of imperial rule, claiming to be the son of a daughter
of the rightful Pharaoh, Apries, as opposed to the
“usurper” pharaoh, Amasis.73 An important question
is to weigh the role of Udjahorresnet in this act of
pharaonization, and some scholars consider that the
chief physician was instrumental in it.74
Yet the above system and state-level explanations
do not address in a sufficiently concrete fashion
Udjahorresnet as a diplomatic figure. For this, we
need to tackle also the individual level. When
analyzing Udjahorresnet’s behavior, we can add a 
third IR concept called “bandwagoning.” Band-
wagoning is a term coined by Quincy Wright and
later popularized by Kenneth N. Waltz, the founder
of structural realism. The basic claim behind the idea
of structural realism is that the distribution of power
in an anarchic environment, i.e., an environment
without a central authority above the community of
states, decisively determines the fate of nations.75
Bandwagoning describes a situation where a weaker
state decides to acquiesce before a great power as the
cost of opposing a stronger power exceeds the 
benefits. IR scholars have a tendency to equate band-
wagoning with hegemonism, which is contrary to
the logic of power balancing. However, bandwagoning
and power balancing are not mutually exclusive
since both strategies reflect the delicate and often
abruptly changing nature of power. Modern examples
of bandwagoning are numerous and include most
recently the policy of the so-called “New Europe,”
i.e., the Eastern European NATO members, who
aligned themselves with the United States during
the Iraq War in 2003.76 Although the IR literature
tends to emphasize bandwagoning at the state level,
we can relatively easily apply this concept to the 
interactions of individuals as well, for international
history is replete with examples where persons in
high positions have decided to go along with the
novel power structure rather than to fight a losing
battle against it. 
One of the more prominent cases of band-
wagoning emanating from the ancient world is that
of Hieron, the tyrant of Syracuse who chose to band-
wagon during the First Punic War (264−241 BCE).
Hieron, the ruler of Syracuse on the island of Sicily,
which was one of the biggest Greek city-states in the
Mediterranean, faced a geopolitical predicament,
squeezed as the island was between two giant 
warring Mediterranean powers: Carthage and
Rome. Leaning on the ancient Greek author
Polybius, Adrian Goldsworthy, a historian, and
Kenneth N. Waltz, an IR scholar, have seen in
Hieron’s behavior the makings of power balancing,
but in the final analysis his policy definitely looks
more like bandwagoning.77 Polybius (I 83. 2−4) opens
up the dilemma of Hieron in following terms: 
Hieron had always responded promptly to
every request they had made of him in this
war, and now he was even more committed
to doing so, since he was sure that it was in
his own best interests—for the preservation
of his rule in Sicily and of good terms with
Rome—that Carthage should survive, and
because he did not want to see the stronger
side in a position to gain its objective without
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any struggle. This was sound and sensible
thinking on his part: such a situation should
never be ignored, nor should one help anyone
gain so much power that disagreement be-
comes impossible even when everyone knows
where justice lies.78
                                                    
Interestingly, Polybius’ account of Hieron’s policy
appears to be the only surviving implicit description
of the logics of power balancing in the premodern
world. While Hieron seems to have understood the
mechanisms of balancing, what puts him in the
category of bandwagoning is the fact that in 263 BCE
he ultimately chose the Roman camp as he saw the
Carthaginians losing the war. Admittedly, he didn’t
have much of a choice from a power political
perspective, for it is hard to see how the Romans
would have accepted even a neutral city-state of
Syracuse in the battle against the Carthaginians in 
Sicily. Nevertheless, the crucial link between band-
wagoning and balancing relates to the fact that the
very act of choosing sides based on the changing
nature of power only becomes possible if the actor
has a general understanding of the relative strength
of the rival parties and acts on it. Accordingly, with-
out an overall grasp of how the political landscape
functions, the weaker actors would not be able to
conduct meaningful alliance strategies. This kind of
opportunism is well attested in the history of the
ANE especially during the second millennium,
which provides a rich environment for band-
wagoning practices by the vassal states in the Levant,
in particular. The rulers of these buffer kingdoms
were quick to switch their allegiance to the stronger
power as deemed convenient.79
When we compare the story of Udjahorresnet to
the bandwagoning efforts of the vassal rulers in the
Levant, there are obvious differences, for Udjahor-
resnet was not a king and, in comparison, 
Egypt was a major state, unlike the small subordi-
nate states in the Syria-Palestine area. However, we
get a hint of the fact that Udjahorresnet was seduced
by power and certainly embraced the new power
holder when he stated that “His majesty assigned to
me the office of chief physician. He made me live at
his side as ‘friend’ and ‘administrator of the
palace.’”80 This passage gives the impression that
Udjahorresnet is on the receiving end, although
maintaining evidently a very privileged position.
This would fit the image of someone who has fully
accepted to cooperate with the conqueror, and the
“gold of honor” given to Udjahorresnet further 
corroborates this. That the Persian monarchy
rewarded conquered provincial elites with impor-
tant honors and tasks throughout the empire
including, e.g., Metiochus, the victor of Marathon,
the former Spartan king Demaratus, or the victor at
Salamis Themistocles, fits a wider practice.81 It 
certainly made sense on the part of the Persians to 
“bribe” high officials’ compliance. In Udjahorres-
net’s case, we also have to bear in mind the rather
benevolent nature, in relative terms, of the
Achaemenid rule, which made it easier for the
Egyptian officials to accept the foreign rule. On the
other hand, Udjahorresnet’s collaboration with the
Persians was also intended to benefit Egypt, so he
was not simply after personal gain and glory but
was genuinely, perhaps, interested in the well-being
of his home country, although scholars are some-
what divided on this question.82 It seems that the
special relationship between Egypt and Persia in the
time of Persian takeover was linked to the auspi-
cious circumstances of benevolent Persian rulership
combined with Udjahorresnet’s tact in the art of
diplomacy. However, we have to be careful not to
take this argument too far. While the supposed 
“tolerance” of Persian rule has often been empha-
sized in contrast to the harshness, severity, and even
brutality of Assyrian rulers of Sargon, Sennacherib,
or Assurbanipal, bordering on the classic theme of
“oriental despotism,” scholars have seen a lot of 
continuity between the two empires in terms of
words, images, and deeds.83 There is, nonetheless,
one aspect differentiating the two empires, and this
relates to the flexibility in the administrative aspects
of imperial order: the Persians tended to give more
leeway to local customs, including religious ones,
and traditions. This fact made the imperial land-
scape of the Achaemenid rule more conducive to the
practice of bandwagoning. 
In his efforts to ensure as smooth a
“pharaonization” of the Persians on the Egyptian
throne as possible, Udjahorresnet showed realism
and even “statesmanship” to use a modern term.84
Accordingly, we can add yet another IR concept in
view of Udjahorresnet’s and Persia’s reciprocal
diplomatic maneuvers: “soft power.” Before
deciphering this concept any further, it is pertinent
to explain the term “power.” In political science and
international relations, “power” is what molecules
and tissues are to biologists and medical scientists:
it is omnipresent, unavoidable, and sometimes
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elusive. In the late 1950s, American political scientist
Robert A. Dahl, partly drawing on Max Weber’s
earlier theorizing, defined power as “A’s power over
B to the extent that he can get B to do something that
B would not otherwise do.”85 This somewhat crude
and overly general definition of power has been
much theorized since then as scholars have
distinguished between relational, institutional, and
structural power.86 What has stayed, however, is the
relational aspect of the concept, which is revealing
in the same way as the gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita tells us a whole lot more about the
wealth of nations than the nominal GDP. However,
power in itself is just an abstract term; what gives
meaning to it is the way we wield it. There is a
tendency to assume that in the ancient world
coercive power or hard power was the rule—we
think of Pax Assyriaca, Pax Romana, and in our
present case, Pax Persica. Behind these Latin
expressions lies the idea that somehow the peace
was imposed by an imperial power on its subjects. 
Undoubtedly, peace building was usually hegemonic
in nature in the premodern world. There is a well-
known passage from the Roman historian Tacitus in
Agricola (ca. 98 CE) that encapsulates what peace,
achieved by imperial means, meant: 
It is no use trying to escape their arrogance
by submission or good behavior. They have
pillaged the world: when the land has
nothing left for men who ravage everything,
they scour the sea. If an enemy is rich, they
are greedy, if he is poor, they crave glory.
Neither East nor West can sate their
appetite. They are the only people on earth
to covet wealth and poverty with equal
craving. They plunder, they butcher, they
ravish, and call it by the lying name of
‘empire’. They make a desert and call it
“peace”.87
There has been some speculation about Tacitus’
motives, as he was of Celtic ancestry with a family
background in southern Gaul, for including this
kind of anti-Roman passage by a Caledonian
(modern-day Scotland) warlord named Calgacus on
the eve of the Battle of Mons Graupius (ca. 83 CE) in
his work.88 Whether this story is true or not,
circumstantial evidence certainly supports Tacitus’
critical view of Roman imperialism, for more than a
century earlier, the Greek historian Diodorus
Siculus, perhaps leaning on Polybius, lamented the
way the Romans: 
… held sway over virtually the whole
inhabited world, they confirmed their
power by terrorism and by the destruction
of the most eminent cities. Corinth they
razed to the ground, the Macedonians they
rooted out, they razed Carthage and the
Celtiberian city of Numantia…89
These stories raise the question of what was the
vision of peace in the ancient world. The rock relief
at Behistun can give us a partial answer to this end.
In it, the policy of the “Achaemenid Peace” according
to king Darius I is to maintain obedience and
unwavering loyalty on the part of the subjects.
According to Darius this can be attained through the
stick and carrot approach, he writes:
Says Darius the King: These are the
countries which … were my subjects….
Within these countries, the man who was
loyal, him, I rewarded well; him who was
evil, him I punished well. By the favor of
Ahuramazda, these countries showed
respect toward my law; as was said to them
by me, thus was it done.90
That the Persians were ready to use harsh
measures, even terror, to crush rebellions within the
empire is well recorded, but this was not unusual to
other empires either. It was part of a conscious policy
aimed at preserving the empire intact, for any sign
of weakness was bound to stir rebellions. However,
the Persians’ approach to power was more complex
than the mere use of naked force. The Persian royal
ideology was comparatively flexible in the
administrative aspects of the imperial order. The
Persian crown turned away from drastic
“pacification” methods used by the Assyrians such
as mass deportations, and embraced, instead, the
‘carrot and stick’ approach.91 In IR terms, this is
called smart power—the combination of both hard
and soft power.92 It is not for nothing that in Judaism
there is a great sympathy toward Cyrus the Great,
who put an end to the Babylonian captivity. This
contrasts strikingly to the Roman emperor Hadrian,
who is referred to in Jewish literature with the
epithet “May his bones rot in hell!” for having
waged an almost genocidal war against the Jews
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during the Bar Kochba revolt in ca. 132−136 CE,
when over half a million people perished, according
to the ancient sources.93
Soft power is a concept introduced to IR
scholarship in 1990 by Joseph Nye, who later
popularized it in Soft Power: The Means to Success in
World Politics (2004). The idea behind soft power is
that hard coercive power is not the only option
available in the toolbox of statecraft; instead,
persuasion, attraction, and emulation also matter.94
The term is useful for our purposes because, similar
to balance of power, it is transhistorical in nature, i.e.,
it can be analyzed in different chronological and
cultural contexts. There is something subtle about
soft power, as Pawel Surowiec and Philip Long
recognize. Following Joseph Nye’s line of thought
they also define soft power as more than “... just ...
the ability to move people by argument,” linking it
to the power of attraction: if attraction leads to
acquiescence, then the intangible and indirect
influence of soft power has concrete effects and
consequences on international politics.95 At the risk
of exaggerating, it can be said that if war is a
continuation of politics by other means, to
paraphrase Carl von Clausewitz’s well-known
dictum, soft power is a continuation of conflict
management by other means, i.e., by seeking to
avoid violence between potentially conflicting
parties. In the 21st century, one prominent example
of the use of soft power is the way Russia interfered
in the US presidential elections in 2016 through
various efforts of disinformation; accordingly,
President Putin has rather successfully influenced
the internal political process of the world’s sole
superpower without actually engaging in direct
confrontation with America. Another example
would be the way China (e.g., loans, investments),
Russia (e.g., gas, oil), and the OPEC (oil) countries
are using their economic muscle in trade policy for
attaining foreign policy goals in global politics. IR
scholars call this phenomenon geo-economics.
Basically, it means economic power projection to
promote and defend national interests to produce
beneficial geopolitical ends by resorting, if need be,
to economic pressures against countries not
complying with the interests of a great power.96 Geo-
economics fits the profile of soft power, because it
falls short of resorting to the actual use of military
power, thus giving the concept of power a more
nuanced meaning.
There is no reason to think that the concept of soft
power applies solely to modern diplomacy. But how
exactly did it manifest itself in the world of Udjahor-
resnet if power was ostensibly predominantly based
on hard power? In an effort to answer this question,
we can go back more than a decade before the battle
of Pelusium, which led to the defeat of Egypt by the
Achaemenid empire. It is in this context, following
the Persian conquest of Babylon in 539 BCE, that a
declaration in Akkadian cuneiform script was 
written in the name of the Achaemenid empire-
builder Cyrus the Great. In 1880 British orientalist
and one of the founding figures of Assyriology
Henry C. Rawlinson referred to the text as “Notes on
a Newly-Discovered Clay Cylinder of Cyrus the
Great”, the epithet “Cyrus Cylinder” used in his 
article would stick to posterity.97 The soft power
aspects of the declaration lie in the passage where it
is written that:
Without battle and fighting he let him
(Cyrus) enter his city Babylon. He saved
Babylon from its oppression…. All the
inhabitants of Babylon, the whole of the land
of Sumer and Akkad, princes and governors
knelt before him, kissed his feet, rejoiced at
his kingship….98
Scholars have justifiably been critical of the signifi-
cance of the Cyrus Cylinder and stressed the
propagandist rather than human rights aspect of the
declaration by Cyrus. While we can concur with this
assessment, for a student of international relations
the real question, then, is what kinds of political
ends the declaration served. Assuming that Persia
wanted to gain certain political legitimacy in the
eyes of the Babylonians, whom they had conquered,
it is possible to think that the idea behind was to
gain political capital among the locals. The term
“political capital” was introduced to political theory
in 1961 by Edward C. Banfield, who understood it to
be the “employment of incentives at one’s disposal
so as to secure the cooperation one needs to accom-
plish one’s immediate purposes.”99 Although
Banfield applied the term almost exclusively to the
structure of government in the metropolitan area of
Chicago, his definition has wider historical implica-
tions, as Banfield was interested in the overall
dynamics of influence in different political settings
and its workings on people and institutions.100 In the
field of sociology, Pierre Bourdieu has likened polit-
ical capital to a credit founded on belief and
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recognition, which means that agents confer on a
person the very powers that they recognize in him.101
In the case of Achaemenid Persia we can argue that
the Persians converted this recognition into winning
the hearts and minds of their newly conquered 
subjects in order to make the costs of an expanding
empire more manageable. The timing was opportune
for the Persians to enter Babylonia, since there was a
wide discontent among the local population against
Nabonidus, the last king of the Neo-Babylonian 
Empire. Despite the problematic aspects related to
the Cyrus Cylinder, the Achaemenids tended to
share a somewhat different governing philosophy—
certainly they did not want to rule an empire with
the same iron fist as did the Assyrians. Against this
background, it is perfectly feasible to think that they
willingly gave similar slack to Egypt and Udjahor-
resnet.
The problem with ancient sources is the fact that
there is often not enough textual material to make
strong judgment calls in whatever direction. In the
specific case of the story of Udjahorresnet, the
challenge lies in the fact that it is by no means a
personal diary but rather an official autobiographical
document. Objective reporting of current events was
virtually nonexistent in the ancient Near East and for
the most part in the wider Mediterranean world as
well. Yet the general explanation about the state of
historiography in the ancient world is obviously not
satisfactory, for nothing takes away the fact that
there was finality and plurality in the historical
thinking of ancient Mesopotamians and Egyptians
as scholars already in the 1950s recognized.102 As
alluded to earlier, there is something elusive and
delicate about the nature of power. One should
remember that even in the contemporary world
people in high positions of power rarely leave
explicit evidence behind them on controversial
issues, for this would be too compromising for
posterity. This is also the view of Stephen Pelz,
specializing in contemporary diplomatic history,
who reminds us that “many international leaders
take pains to disguise their reasoning and
purposes.”103 This logic must have been the case in
the Achaemenid empire as well.104 Nevertheless,
modern scholars, such as Alan B. Lloyd, have not
shied away from making the case that “...
Udjahorresnet was perfectly willing to throw in his
lot with the Persians….”105 This interpretation
translates into being a “collaborator,” which in
power political terms equals to bandwagoning. From
an IR perspective, bandwagoning in some ways
better captures the personal choices of Udjahorresnet
because it stresses, how persons—and ultimately
states—tend to behave when facing overwhelming
power, which they are not in a position to resist
effectively. Being a collaborator seems too narrow a
term with its value-laden connotations of the Second
World War period. The word “collaborator” is still
widely used in scholarship analyzing the story of 
Udjahorresnet, but there have recently been publica-
tions that try to challenge common terminology and
instead talk about “pragmatism” instead of collabo-
ration.106 Behind pragmatism lies the structural
macro-level of political realities, as Persia had
become the hegemonic power putting an end to the
close interaction of a multicentric political arena. In
power political terms, this meant that the Egyptians
had very little room in which to maneuver against
the Persians. What made Egypt exceptional, how-
ever, was its capacity to accommodate the new
order—and in this, the role of Udjahorresnet was
instrumental.
CONCLUSIONS
This article endeavored to contextualize the story of
Udjahorresnet from the vantage point of interna-
tional relations rather than from the standpoint of 
history. The IR theorizing, while not typically
digging into the ancient Near Eastern world, can
provide the interested reader with theoretical
insights that facilitate historians to treat the
empirical aspects of their research more critically
and to focus on societal structures, not only on
specific events and human agency. At the same time,
IR scholarship has a lot to gain by engaging
substantively with empirical historical facts that can
make theory-building more viable; it is a question of
finding the right balance between parsimony and
thick description. In any event, the international
arena of the ancient Near East offers a fertile ground
for this, as cities, writing, administration and
collection of laws, social stratification, state
formation, even a primitive democracy, and other
innovations in human endeavor saw birth for the
first time in Western Asia. Nascent signs suggest that
students of world politics are taking the ancient Near
East more seriously. From an empirical perspective,
the transhistorical concepts of balance of power,
bandwagoning, and soft power, and the theoretical
constructs of “the level of analysis” and international
system allow to combine micro- and macro-level
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perspectives over wide temporal and geographic
spectrums. The balance of power and soft power, in
particular, are interesting in this context, as they
have been analyzed in the field of international
relations almost without exception in post-Roman
context. The autobiography of Udjahorresnet
suggests that these essential tools of statecraft did
play a part in the overall picture when the
neighboring states to Persia tried, but ultimately
failed, to counterbalance its rise. By contrast, the soft
power measures, on the part of both Udjahorresnet
and the Achaemenids, were something of a success,
although without long-lasting effects. 
In spite of all our knowledge about the diplomatic
figure of Udjahorresnet, there are aspects to his story
that are bound to be shrouded in mystery. The
traditions of historical writing in ancient Egypt with
emphasis on strict formulas and mythological
prototypes, as well as bias and propaganda, set their
limits as to what we can make of the available
primary sources.107 Yet there is another reason,
which has nothing to do with historiography. By its
very nature, diplomacy, especially matters that fall
into what IR scholars call “high politics,” i.e.,
national self-preservation or issues of war and peace,
was and is a secretive enterprise, and before the era
of the so-called open diplomacy after the First World
War, this was even more so.108 With this caveat in
mind, the story of Udjahorresnet is, nevertheless,
revealing. What is, then, the final conclusion or
“judgment” we can make of Udjahorresnet in light
of the evidence? Traitor seems hardly an appropriate
term in this context neither in concrete nor rhetorical
sense. Already during the 1st millennium BCE, the
complex interdependence was such that a member
of elite cooperating with a foreign invader did not 
automatically qualify for treason. Had Udjahorresnet
not worked with the Persians, the latter would, no
doubt, have found another candidate to take his
place. There simply was no rationale for resistance,
as the Persian power and hegemony became evident
all over the Near East. It is hard not to think that
both parties used each other for political and personal
reasons. Udjahorresnet gained in social status: he
could claim to be the savior of Egypt in the face of
difficult circumstances. Crucially, we can also notice
that Udjahorresnet was an active player in the field. 
Instead of just passively accepting the role of an
enabler in service of the Persians, he was
instrumental in the process of pharaonization of the
Great Kings. The Persians, on their part, found a
useful native official with valuable local knowledge
of the local sensitivities to smooth the Persian
occupation and maintain the status quo. Someone
who chose to bandwagon thus qualifies as a more
accurate characterization of these events, and this
appellation is certainly less stigmatizing. In the end,
what we can be absolutely sure about is that
Udjahorresnet, the chief physician, had a unique
eyewitness position vis-á-vis the Achaemenid rule.
Hopefully this will continue to generate academic
interest in the framework of increasing cross-
disciplinary dialogue.
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NOTES
1 Throughout the essay, international politics,
international relations, and world politics are
used as synonyms as far as they refer to the
academic discipline of international relations.
For issues of terminology used in the field of IR,
see, e.g., Burchill and Linklater 2013, 1, 13. Also
see Evans and Newnham 1998, 274–275, and
Owens et al. 2017, 2.
2 What science is and whether international
relations can or should be a science is a vast and
complex topic within the discipline, which
continues to raise heated debates. For a more
detailed discussion, see, e.g., Wight 2013 and
Schmidt 2013, 3−8.
3 For further details, see, e.g., Hoffmann 1995;
Nye, Jr., 2008, 649; Onuf 2016, 36−37. 
4 For further knowledge on parsimonious theoriz-
ing, see Levy 2001, 54−59; Levy 1997. 
5 State as a modern concept derives its roots from
Renaissance political thought—lo stato and its
derivatives in other European languages (el
stado, l’état, Der Staat) date back to 15th and 17th
centuries; see, e.g., Skinner 2009, 325. The most
prominent authors to theorize on the concept in
Western political thought have been Niccolò
Machiavelli, Jean Bodin, Johann Gottfried
Herder, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and
Max Weber; see Skinner 2009, 325−328; Dyson
1991.
6 For further information, see Kaufman and
Wohlforth 2007, 23−24.
7 See Oppenheim 1977, 28−30.
8 See Lawson 2018, 86.
9 See Berenskoetter 2016, 9.
10 Lafont 2001, 41.
11 For further details on the Naoforo Vaticano, see
Colburn 2016, 226−227, 233; Posener 1936, 1−2,
26−27; Baines 1996, 83, fn. 1; Lloyd 1982, 167−168;
Lopez 2015, 84−85. Also see this volume, passim,
especially the contributions by Ruggero, Schütze,
and Wasmuth.
12 There is no clear-cut evidence available on the
lifespan of Udjahorresnet, but it is believed that
he lived sometime between 550–510 BCE. For
further details, see Posener 1936, 6−7; Lopez
2015, 76.
13 One such example is the Egyptian treasurer
Ptahhotep, who worked closely with the Persians
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